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The Case for Clumsiness
Michael Thompson, Marco Verweij

CLUMSY SOLUTIONS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD
Michael Thompson and Marco Verweij
Most climatologists agree that by burning fossil fuels and engaging in other forms of consumption and production we are increasing the amount of greenhouse gases that float around in the atmosphere. These gases, in trapping some of the sun's heat, warm the earth and enable life. The trouble is, some predict, that if we continue to accumulate those gases, over the course of the new century the average temperature on earth will rise and local climates will change, with possibly catastrophic consequences. Will this indeed happen? If so, should we do something about it? And if yes, what and when? Does climate change put the future of the world at risk? Can only a radical reallocation of global wealth and power rescue us from this threat? Or should people not be overly worried, as the steady march of technological progress will see us through in the end?
In our view, people do not offer a great many different answers to such questions.
In fact, we argue that the various ways in which people understand a phenomenon like global warming are derived from a strictly limited number of alternative perceptions of reality. These alternative ways of perceiving the world justify, represent, and emerge from alternative ways of organizing social relations. In this introduction we claim that successful solutions to pressing social ills consist of creative and flexible combinations of these different ways of organizing, perceiving and social relations. This claim is at the heart of what we have come to call 'clumsiness', and is illustrated in the rest of the issue.
The current landscape of the social sciences can for our present purposes be divided roughly into two camps. One camp is built on the assumption that human beings are fundamentally the same. Rational choice theory -or the economic approach to social analysis-is a major contender from this camp. Via its 'homogeneity assumption,' this approach posits that all individuals are similarly rational, or self-interested. The second camp harbors a contrary position: the only goal to which social scientists can truly aspire is to document how every person, community, and epoch is incomparably different from other people, communities, and epochs. Post-structuralism, for instance, explicitly rejects making generalizations about social life on the grounds that such an exercise would always do injustice to the uniqueness of people and cultures. But also many of those who have not embraced post-structuralist tenets have ended up arguing that social scientists can only uncover causal relationships that are entirely local and temporary. 1 We feel that both of these edifices sit on shaky foundations. In view of the cultural and social variety across time and space, it seems implausible to insist that all individuals merely follow a single rationality. It is not possible to explain social differences -for instance, why war or poverty reigns here and now but not there and then-merely on the basis of human universals. If everybody were similarly rational or self-interested, then this factor could not explain any differences between cases;
ironically, by assuming that everyone is similarly rational or self-interested, rationality and self-interest are ruled out as explanatory factors in any comparative analysis. Yet if it were true that individuals were wholly different from each other, how could we ever manage to communicate across cultures, understand history, cooperate, and interpret new events? 2 In the words of Isaiah Berlin:
As for the issue of relativity and the subjective nature of values, I wonder whether this has not, for the sake of argument, been exaggerated by philosophers: whether men and their outlooks have differed, over wide stretches of space and time, as greatly as has at times been represented. … If values had varied very widely between cultures and periods, communication would have been harder to achieve, and our historical knowledge, which depends on some degree of ability to understand the goals and motives and ways of life at work in cultures different from our own, would turn out to be an illusion. 3 Fortunately, we don't have to choose between these two extreme positions. It is possible -at least in principle-to distinguish simultaneously between a limited number of social and cultural forms, and still recognize wide social and cultural variety. Physics has maintained that all the material objects that we can observe on earth and beyond consist of endlessly varying combinations of only six basic particles (or, in more recent formulations, a small number of strings). Analogously, it might be possible to discern a limited number of fundamental forms of social organization from which a large variety of ultimate forms of social and cultural life can be derived. This is the starting point of what
we have come to call cultural theory. 4 The original aim of this theory was to devise a typology of social forms that fitto the extent possible-the classificatory schemes developed by the grand old social theorists (Durkheim, Tönnies, Maine, Weber, etc.) , as well as the evidence collected in subsequent ethnographic studies. 5 According to our cultural theory, there are four primary ways of organizing, perceiving, and justifying social relations (usually called 'ways of life,' or 'social solidarities'): egalitarianism, hierarchy, individualism and fatalism.
We postulate that these four ways of life are in conflict in every conceivable domain of social life. Most such domains (say the way in which a school operates, or the way in which an international regime functions) will consist of some dynamic combination of these pure forms. As many social domains can be distinguished within and between societies (and as many societies can be distinguished around the world), the theory allows one to perceive a wide and ever-changing cultural and social varietywhile still enabling one to formulate general propositions about social and political life.
These propositions include possible ways in which people perceive and attempt to stave off a threat such as climate change. In order to explain and illustrate this, we will have to set out our cultural theory in some detail.
Each of the four ways of life consists of a specific way of structuring social relations and a supporting cast of particular beliefs, values, emotions, perceptions, and interests. 6 Our fourfold typology is strictly derived from two dimensions of sociality:
what we will call 'grid' and 'group'. 7 Grid measures the extent to which role differentiation constrains the behavior of individuals: where roles are primarily ascribed, grid constraints are high; where roles are primarily a matter of choice, grid constraints are low. Group, by contrast, measures the extent to which an overriding commitment to a social unit constrains the thought and action of individuals.
High-group strength results when people devote a lot of their available time to interacting with other members of their unit. In general, the more things they do together, and the longer they spend doing them, the higher the group strength. Where admission to the social unit is hard to obtain, making the unit more exclusive and conscious of its boundary, the group strength also tends to be high. An extreme case of high group strength is the monastic community whose members renounce their private property upon entering and depend on the corporate body for all their material and social needs. Highgroup strength of this sort requires a long-term commitment and a tight identification of members with one another as a corporate identity. Individuals are expected to act on behalf of the collective whole, and the corporate body is expected to act in the normative interests of its members.
Group strength is low when people negotiate their way through life on their own behalves as individuals, neither constrained by, nor reliant upon, a single group of others.
Instead, low-group people interact as individuals with other individuals, picking and choosing with whom they will associate, as their present preoccupations and perceived interests demand. The low-group experience is a competitive, entrepreneurial way of life where the individual is not strongly constrained by duty to other persons. Attractive though this freedom from constraint might first appear to some, there is a serious disadvantage: in a low group context, you cannot count on the support of your fellows should your personal fortune wane. In the high-group context, the safety net of social support compensates for the loss of personal autonomy.
Grid stands for the complementary bundle of constraints on social interaction.
Grid is high whenever roles are distributed on the basis of explicit public social classifications, such as gender, color, position in a hierarchy, holding a bureaucratic office, descent in a senior clan or lineage, or point of progression through an age-grade system. It is low when classificatory distinctions only weakly limit the range of social choices and activities open to people. A low-grid social environment is one in which access to roles depends on personal abilities to compete or negotiate for them, or even on formal regulations that ensure equal access and opportunity to compete. In either case, access to roles is not dependent on any ascribed characteristics of rank or birth.
Assigning two values (high and low) 8 to the grid and group dimensions gives the four ways of organizing, perceiving and justifying social relations. Egalitarianism is associated with a low-grid score and a high-group score. The combination of a high score on the grid dimension (many rules prescribing people's roles) with a high score on the group dimension (strong group boundaries) gives the hierarchical way. The third way of organizing and justifying social relations, individualism, is associated with low scores on both the grid and group scales. Last, fatalism is characterized by a high-grid and a lowgroup score.
We are now in a position to describe how these four different forms of association tend to produce different ways of perceiving nature (including human nature), and the policy prescriptions that follow from that. In an egalitarian social setting, actors see nature as fragile, intricately interconnected and ephemeral, and man as essentially caring (until corrupted by coercive institutions such as markets and hierarchies). We must all tread lightly on the earth, and it is not enough that people start off equal; they must end up equal as well -equality of result. What is remarkable about all these divergent examples is that they cannot be pinned down to a single level of social organization, or 'level of analysis' -indeed they range all the way from individual households to global institutions. Cultural theory assumes social life to be of a fractal nature. 10 That is to say, the same four forms of organizing and perceiving are supposed to be interacting -forever merging, splitting and recombining-in unpredictable ways at each conceivable level of social organization (e.g., families, firms, ministries or football clubs), with the patterns that result within the domains at one level of society combining to form the same four ways of organizing and perceiving within the domains at a higher level of society (e.g., the system of interest representation within a country, or an international regime). Thus, four straightforward organizational principles can create an endlessly changing, infinitely varied and complex social world.
11
Some will argue that this typology represents nothing new. Derived from classifications proposed by the founding fathers of the social sciences, it also overlaps with a host of more recent categorizations. These would include the typical reactions to decline that Hirschman has described (exit, loyalty and voice), the patterns of economic action that Polyani has pointed out (market, redistribution and reciprocity), the sorts of proposed to add a third type to Weber's classical distinction between market and bureaucracy: collegiums (Majone), community (Schmitter and Streeck; Perrow; Miller; Etzioni) , trust (Granovetter; Bradach and Eccles), society (Wiesenthal) , clans (Ouchi), forum (Elster) or civil society (e.g., Seligman).
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We agree with this assertion, but do not see the overlap as a drawback of cultural theory. On the contrary, we feel that these similarities fortify our assumption that human relations tend to be organized in a restricted number of ways. Moreover, in comparison to other taxonomies, the grid-group classification comes with several advantages. Not only does it add a fourth way of organizing to many classifications (usually fatalism), it also spells out the basic perceptions that typically underpin alternative ways of organizing. In addition, cultural theory's typology is usually more fine-grained than other classifications (being of a fractal nature, it can also be used to distinguish among different types of bureaucracies, markets or civil societies), and can be applied to any possible domain of human life (from sexual relations to the nuclear arms race). On the basis of these characteristics, Harry Eckstein argued that the four ways of life constitute 'especially promising constructions for cultural typology' that encapsulate 'a great many meanings into a limited set of supermeanings'. 13 Cultural theory has several normative implications. 14 First, there is the realization that people are arguing from different premises and that, since these premises are anchored in different forms of solidarity, they will never agree. Second, in line with the 'argumentative turn' in policy analysis, this contention, as well as being unavoidable, is all to the good: something to be harnessed through constructive communication. 15 Each way of organizing and perceiving distils certain elements of experience and wisdom that are missed by the others. Each way of organizing and perceiving provides a clear expression of the way in which a significant portion of the populace feels we should live with one another and with nature. And each one needs all the others in order to be sustainable. 16 It is useful to set out this latter point in some detail. Under pure egalitarianism there are no peaceful mechanisms, other than an endless search for consensus, for deciding between alternative opinions. There is no official leadership that can settle issues, nor a voting mechanism that can be invoked. This lack of procedures for settling conflicts can easily paralyze egalitarian social settings. It can also give rise to the violent expulsion of dissenters. In addition, pure egalitarianism creates social ills by ruling out any activities that would give rise to inequality of condition. This limits economic production to a bare minimum, as many forms of economic life contain a competitive element. Hence, undiluted egalitarianism will have to be mixed with at least minimal doses of the other ways of organizing and perceiving, if it is not to evaporate. Hierarchy has a whole 'armory of different solutions to internal conflicts, upgrading, shifting sideways, downgrading, re-segregating and re-defining' (Douglas 1978: 20 It is therefore important that all the ways of life be taken some sort of account of in the policy process. And that, for all its simplicity, is the essence of clumsiness: all the 'voices' heard, and responded to by the others. We can now return to the issue of climate change, and show how our theory sorts out, and clarifies, the ongoing disputes regarding this topic -and what this implies for governance.
The Contested Terrain of Climate Change
Cultural Theory is emphatically a dynamic theory, with its typology identifying the timeless components in the ever-changing positions that are the destinations and points of departure for all that endless movement. In other words, the precise policies and arguments taken up will continuously change, yet whatever policies are fought over, they will continue to represent a small number of competing ways of organizing and perceiving social relations. We can therefore use the theory to take a snapshot of the present state of the climate change-debate.
The current positions in the debate on climate change can be read as three policy stories (three, because the fatalist solidarity has no voice; if it had it would not be fatalistic). Each policy story provides a setting (the basic assumptions), a villain (the policy problem), heroes (policy protagonists), and, of course, a moral (the policy solution). Each story emphasizes different aspects of the climate change issue. What is more, each story defines itself in contradistinction to the other policy stories.
Profligacy: an egalitarian story
This story begins by pointing to the profligate consumption and production patterns of the North as the fundamental cause of global climate change. Rich industrialized countries, so the argument goes, are recklessly pillaging the world's resources with little regard to the wellbeing of either the planet or the peoples of its poorer regions. Global climate change is more than an issue that is amenable to quick technical fixes; it is a fundamentally moral and ethical issue.
The setting for this story is a world in which everything is intricately connected to everything else, and nature is fragile. Whether this concerns human society or the natural world, this story urges us to think of Planet Earth as a single living entity. Environmental degradation, then, is also an attack on human wellbeing. Humans, so the argument goes, have, until now, successfully deluded themselves that they can live apart from the natural environment. In reality, however, there is no place for humans outside nature and thus no particular reason for considering humans as superior to nature. In short, this story is set in an ecocentric world.
The villain, in the profligacy story, is the fundamentally inequitable structure of advanced industrial society. In particular, the profit motive and the obsession with economic growth -the driving forces of global capitalism-have not only brought us to the brink of ecological disaster; they have also distorted our understanding of both the natural and the social world. Global commerce and the advertising industry lead us to desire environmentally unsustainable products (bottled water, fast cars, or high protein foods, for example) while our real human needs (living in harmony with nature and with each other: the egalitarian social construction of human nature) go unfulfilled. What is more, advanced capitalism distributes the spoils of global commerce highly inequitably. This is true within countries (the increasing gap between the rich classes and the poor classes) and among countries (the increasing gap between the affluent countries of the North and the destitute countries of the South). In short, prevailing structural inequalities have led to increasingly unsustainable patterns of consumption and production.
Since everything is connected to everything else, this story continues, we cannot properly understand environmental degradation unless we see it as a symptom of this wider social malaise. The way humans pollute, degrade and destroy the natural world is merely a very visible indicator for the way they treat each other and particularly the weaker members of society. The logic that allows us to fell thousands of square kilometers of rainforests, to dump toxins in waterways, or pollute the air is precisely the same logic that produces racism, misogyny and xenophobia. Tackling one problem inevitably implies tackling all the others.
The heroes of the profligacy story are those organizations and individuals who have managed to see through the chimera of progress in advanced industrial society. They are those groups and persons that understand that the fate of humans is inextricably linked to the fate of Planet Earth. The heroes understand that, in order to halt environmental degradation, we have to address the fundamental global inequities. In short, the heroes of the profligacy policy argument are those organizations of protest, such as Earth First! What, then, is the moral of the profligacy story? Its proponents point to a number of solutions. In terms of immediate policy, the profligacy tale urges us to adopt a strict version of the precautionary principle in all cases: unless policy actors can prove that a particular activity is innocuous to the environment, they should refrain from it. The underlying idea here is that the environment is precariously balanced on the brink of a precipice. The story further calls for drastic cuts in carbon dioxide emissions; since the industrialized North produces most of these emissions, the onus is on advanced capitalist states to take action.
Yet none of these measures, the story continues, is likely to be fruitful on its own. In order to really tackle the problem of global climate change those in the affluent North will have to fundamentally reform their political institutions and their unsustainable lifestyles. Rather than professionalized bureaucracies and huge centralized administrations, the advocates of the profligacy story suggest we decentralize decision-making down to the grassroots level. Rather than continuing to produce ever-increasing amounts of waste,
we should aim at conserving the fragile natural resources we have: we should, in a word, move from the idea of a waste society to the concept of a conserve society. Only then can we meet real human needs. What are real human needs? Simple, they are the needs of Planet Earth.
Earth First! provides a telling example. Here is how this group of 'deep ecologists' sees itself:
To avoid co-option, we feel it is necessary to avoid the corporate organizational structure so readily embraced by many environmental groups. Earth First! is a movement, not an organization. Our structure is non-hierarchical. We have no highly-paid 'professional staff' or formal leadership. … Earth First! has survived attacks by moderates, would-be leaders and the agents of the system, remaining the most diverse, passionate, committed, and uncompromising group of environmental activists. Earth First! is a priority, not an organization. It is the name of our journal, and the slogan of our emerging tribe, but it is a tribe without chiefs. The only 'leaders' are those temporarily working the hardest and taking the most risks. New ideas, strategies and crucial initiative come from individuals, and all decisions are made within affinity groups based on preferred tactics.
And this is how Earth First! sees the problem:
Over the last several hundred years, human civilization has declared war on large mammals, leading some respected ecologists to assert that the only large mammals to survive the near future will be those we humans choose to allow to live. Other prominent biologists, aghast at the wholesale devastation of tropical rainforests and temperate oldgrowth forests, rapidly accelerating desertification, and destruction of 'charismatic megafauna' due to habitat destruction and poaching, say that Earth could lose one quarter to one third of all species within a very few years. Not only is the blitzkrieg against the natural world destroying ecosystems and their associated species, but our activities are now beginning to have fundamental, systemic effects upon the entire life-support system of the planet -upsetting the world's climate, poisoning the oceans, destroying the ozone layer which protects us from excessive ultraviolet radiation, changing the CO2 ratio in the atmosphere, and spreading acid rain, radioactive fallout, pesticides and industrial contamination throughout the biosphere. Clearly, the conservation battle is not one of merely protecting outdoor recreation opportunities; neither is it a matter of elitist aesthetics, nor 'wise management and use' of natural resources. It is a battle for life itself, for the continuous flow of evolution. Wethis generation of humans-are at our most important juncture since we came out of the trees six million years ago. It is our decision, ours today, whether Earth continues to be a marvelously living, diverse oasis in the blackness of space, or whether the charismatic megafauna of the future will consist of Norway rats and cockroaches. To put it simply, the earth must come first.
From this perspective, the solution seems clear:
While many environmental groups are members of the American political establishment and essentially adopt the anthropocentric (human-centered) world view of industrial civilization, we say the ideas and manifestations of industrial civilization are anti-Earth, anti-woman, and anti-liberty. We are developing a new biocentric paradigm based on the intrinsic value of all natural things: Deep Ecology. Earth First! believes in wilderness for its own sake. Lobbying, lawsuits, letter writing and research papers are important and necessary. But they are not enough. Earth First!ers also use confrontation, guerrilla theater, direct action and civil disobedience to fight for wild places and life processes. And while we do not condone or condemn monkeywrenching, ecotage, or other forms of property destruction, we do present a forum for the exchange of ideas on creative opposition to the juggernaut of 'progress', including ideas about monkeywrenching. Friends of the Earth a spot on the 'sell-out list' of Ecodefense.
Lack of global planning: a hierarchical story
Our second story opens with a view on the limits to economic and population growth. In an older rendering of this story, a tale told some thirty years ago, these limits were supposed to lie in the dwindling resources of oil, gas and coal, which -scientific studies had conclusively shown-would not be sufficient to sustain the world's economic growth forever more. Nowadays, after a thirty-year period in which 'proven reserves' of fossil fuels have continuously risen, different limits to economic and population growth are being highlighted. Rather than be afraid of natural resources running out, we should be concerned about the continued use of oil, gas and coal across the globe. Such irresponsible behavior, due to its long-term effects on the world's climates, would eventually wreak havoc on the ecosystems on which human beings depend.
The operative term in this policy story is 'long term'. Although human-made greenhouse gas-emissions have already started to affect ecosystems, there is still time to remedy matters. Unlike the profligacy-story, the hierarchical tale does not include the line that the world is about to come to an end unless we radically change our wicked capitalist ways right now. Enough time is left to plan a gradual, incremental change towards technologies and energy resources that do not emit greenhouse gases. Unfortunately, the 'long term' also plays a less benign role in this tale. The moral of this tale is clear: the only conceivable remedy to climate change is for all the governments and parliaments of the world to formally agree on the extent to which future emissions should be cut, which countries should do so, how, and when.
States should then impose these formal, intergovernmental agreements on the multitude of undiscerning consumers and producers within their borders. This is the logic behind The challenge of globalization in the new century is not to stop the expansion of global markets. The challenge is to find the rules and institutions for stronger governance -local, national, regional and global-to preserve the advantages of global markets and competition, but also to provide enough space for human, community and environmental resources to ensure that globalization works for people -not just for profits.
In the report's final chapter, under the section heading 'Start Now to Build the Global Architecture Required for the 21 st Century', the following conclusion is reached (pp. 110-
11):
With the new challenges of globalization, and the need to ensure stronger action on old problems and new, the time has come to rethink the global architecture. Some of the key elements of an improved international architecture:
• A stronger and more coherent UN system, with more commitment from all countries.
• A global central bank.
• A world investment trust with redistributive functions and transfer mechanism.
• A world environment agency.
• A revised World Trade Organization, fairer and with an expanded mandate.
• An international criminal court, with a broader mandate for human rights.
• A broadened United Nations, with a two-chamber General Assembly to allow for civil society representation.
The 2003 Human Development Report has a chapter devoted to 'Public Policies to Ensure Environmental Sustainability'. In this chapter, it is concluded that (p. 130):
Intergovernmental processes tend to be difficult to organize and slow to execute, but they are the only realistic way to address cross-border pollution and ecosystem degradation.
And (p. 131):
A Life Observatory should be established to systematically monitor major ecosystems such as coastal habitats, major watersheds and wetlands. Such an observatory would complement current efforts, including the Global Terrestrial Observing System, the Global Climate Change Observing System and the Global Oceans Observing System. The Life Observatory should build on the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, a fouryear effort involving 1,500 scientists compiling the best available knowledge on the world's ecosystems and the services they provide. The Life Observatory would ensure that these analyses are continuously updated to map the long-term effects of human activities on specific ecosystems. … Environmental indicators that accurately track the environment should be developed and integrated with national policy-making. Long-term planning should factor in projected changes in climate and changes to specific ecosystems to assess how these trends will affect development progress and needs.
Much ado about nothing: an individualistic story
Those who belong to organizations of a more individualistic bent -the United States'
Cato Institute, for instance, or Britain's Institute of Economic Affairs, or the editorial teams of The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Times-tell a very different tale.
To them, the whole current ballyhoo over climate change and global warming is much ado about nothing -at most just another attempt at scare-mongering by naïve idealists who erroneously believe that the world can be made a better place, and by international bureaucrats looking to expand their own budgets and influence.
Such individualistically organized outfits are skeptical of the diagnosis of climate change itself and they are convinced that, even if it is correct, the consequences will be neither catastrophic nor uniformly negative. Far from being at a six-million-year juncture, we are, they assert, where we have always been: faced with uncertainties and challenges that, if tackled boldly by a diversity of competing agents, can be transformed into opportunities from which all can benefit. They focus on the lacunae in current climatechange science:
• Clouds, whose formation is poorly understood but which are expected to be more prevalent in a warmer world, would likely reflect more sunlight back into space before it reached the earth's surface.
• Human sources of greenhouse gases are dwarfed by natural sources (volcanoes, for instance, and termites and other wood-digesting creatures) -which means that it is impossible in the short-run to say whether any warming (if it is happening) is man-made.
• The climate models that are being used to predict future changes cannot even accurately chart changes that have already occurred.
Looking beyond the short-term, they point out that a carbon-richer climate would increase agricultural productivity, and that, even if the negative impacts did outweigh the positive ones, we would still need to compare the costs of preventing global warming now to the costs of adapting to higher temperatures a few decades hence. Money not spent on preventing climate change, they point out, could be used to tackle other, more On the whole, society's problems and challenges are best dealt with by people and companies interacting with each other freely without interference from politicians and the state. We do not know whether the world is definitively warming, given recent satellite data. If the world is warming, we do not know what is causing the change -man or nature. We do not know whether a warmer world would be a good thing or a bad thing.
[The scientific evidence] does not suggest that immediate action for significant limitation on energy consumption is urgently required. … Until the science of climate change is better understood, no government action should be undertaken beyond the elimination of subsidies and other distortions of the market.
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The Case for Clumsiness
It is only by teasing out these sorts of policy arguments, and their diverse adherents, that we can understand the social constructions of needs and resources: how they are generated, how they are reproduced and transformed, and how they shape the policy process. This understanding has some important implications.
The three stories tell plausible but conflicting tales of climate change. All three tales use reason, logic and science to argue their points. None of the tales is 'wrong', in the sense of being implausible or incredible. Yet, at the same time, none of the stories is completely 'right'; each argument focuses on those aspects of climate change for which there is a suitable solution cast within the terms of a particular form of organization.
These three policy discourses are not reducible to one another. No one of the policy arguments is a close substitute for the others. Nor are any of the stories' proponents ever likely to agree on the fundamental causes of and solutions to the global climate change issue. And, since these stories implicitly convey a normative argument, namely that of the good life (either in egalitarian enclaves, in hierarchies, or in markets), they are curiously immune to enlightenment by 'scientific' facts; we cannot, in any scientific sense, prove or falsify policy stories. This leaves us with a dynamic, plural and argumentative system of policy-definition and policy-framing that policy-makers ignore only at their cost, for three reasons. First, each policy story, as we have seen, thematises a pertinent aspect of the climate change debate.
Any global climate change policy, then, based on only one or two of these stories, will merely provide a response to a specific aspect of the global climate change problem. It will, in short, provide a partially effective response. Second, and more significantly, each of the stories represents a political voice in the policy process. Endemic Conflict: In a policy process where politics matters (that is, in any policy process) there will be at least three divergent but plausible stories that frame the issue, define the problem, and suggest solutions. Thus conflict in policy-making processes is endemic, inevitable, and desirable, rather than pathological, curable or deviant. Any policy process that does not take this into account does so at the risk of losing political legitimacy.
Plural Policy Responses:
We have seen that each story tells a plausible, but selective, story. Any policy response modeled solely in terms of just one or two of these tales will be, at best, partial and, at worst, irrelevant. can take place. 24 If this is not the case, then the policy debate will be an unconstructive dialogue of the deaf.
Quality of Communication
Summarizing all of the above, we have at one extreme an unresponsive monologue and at the other a shouting match amongst the totally deaf. Between these extremes we occasionally find a vibrant multivocality in which each voice formulates its view as persuasively as possible, sensitive to the knowledge that others are likely to disagree, and acknowledging a responsibility to listen to what the others are saying. This is the condition -clumsiness-we must strive for if we value democracy or, as is the case with many regulatory agencies, we are mandated to develop and implement policy on behalf of a democracy. Getting there and staying there is, of course, not easy.
At the monologue end of the spectrum the policy process is seductively elegant and reassuringly free (it would seem) from the defiling intrusion of politics. Here we find the mind-set characterized by single-metric rationality. At the other extreme we wallow in the incoherence of complete relativism. The cultural theory typology presented here suggests that between these extremes there is the possibility of constructive dialogue. It will often be a noisy, discordant, contradictory dialogue, but this is the clumsy beast that democratic policy makers and regulators must seek to harness and ride -in each and every specific situation. On this we agree again with Isaiah Berlin:
The way out must therefore lie in some logically untidy, flexible and even ambiguous compromise. Every situation calls for its own specific policy, since 'out of the crooked timber of humanity', as Kant once remarked, 'no straight thing was ever made'. What the age calls for is not (as we are so often told) more faith, or stronger leadership, or more scientific organization. Rather it is the opposite -less Messianic ardour, more enlightened skepticism, more toleration of idiosyncracies, more frequent ad hoc measures to achieve aims in a foreseeable future… What is required is a less mechanical, less fanatical application of general principles, however rational or righteous, a more cautious and less arrogantly self-confident application of accepted, scientifically tested, general solutions to unexamined individual cases.
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Making Ourselves Clumsy
The term 'clumsy institution' was coined by law professor Michael Shapiro as a way of escaping from the idea that, when we are faced with contradictory definitions of problem and solution, we must choose one and reject the rest. 26 Clumsy institutions, we can say, now that we have the cultural theory-typology, are those institutional arrangements in which none of the voices -the hierarchical call for 'wise guidance and careful stewardship', the individualistic emphasis on 'entrepreneurship and technological progress', the egalitarian insistence that we need 'a whole new relationship with nature', and the fatalist's asking 'why bother?'-is excluded, and in which the contestation is harnessed to constructive, if noisy, argumentation.
Clumsiness emerges as preferable to elegance (optimizing around just one of the definitions of the problem and, in the process, silencing the other voices) once we realize that what looks like irreconcilable contradiction is, in fact, essential contestation. 27 From the reflexive vantage point that is afforded us by our fourfold typology, and with the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen that many of our public institutions -Britain's former Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the World Trade Organization, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and most national overseas aid agencies, to mention but a few-are insufficiently clumsy and, in consequence, erosive of democracy.
Most policy tools (all single metrics such as cost-benefit analysis, probabilistic risk assessment, quality-adjusted life years, general equilibrium modelling) and policy precepts (the insistence on a single agreed definition of the problem, the clear separation of facts and values, and the focus on optimisation) are similarly flawed.
The challenge is therefore how clumsy solutions can best be generated within specific circumstances. We can only give a clumsy answer to this. Each of the active ways of organizing lends itself to a particular preference for how clumsy solutions can be arrived at. In each particular situation, an appropriate and flexible combination of these alternative perspectives needs to be forged. The egalitarian ideal for making ourselves clumsy would be through participatory, deliberative practices. Everybody involved should deliberate freely -from their own perspectives on the good life-until solutions are found on which all can agree. No participant in this deliberative debate should have more power resources (for instance in the form of superior rhetorical skills, more information or better training) than the others, and nobody should be aiming to promote their private interests in the public debate. 28 The hierarchical take on how to generate clumsiness would start from the assumption that ordinary citizens and organizations are simply not well-informed or well-meaning enough to be able to grasp, and balance, all these rather sophisticated, alternative rationales. Instead clumsiness can only be reached, when policy-makers and scientific experts carefully listen to ordinary folk arguing from their partial perspectives, weigh the evidence, weed out the good arguments from the bad, and then construct clumsy solutions in a top-down way. 29 The individualistic view would stress that clumsiness can only be reached in an unplanned and antagonistic way. This view would call for checks and balances between people and organizations adhering to different rationalities. As long as the latter would be forced to respond -through the rules of the game-to each other's criticisms, and show that the accusations hurled at them are unfounded, clumsy solutions could arise in spontaneous, unintended ways, which would not require any form of consensus on any aspect of the issue. 30 Therefore, different ideals for how to make ourselves clumsy can be derived from the various ways of organizing and perceiving, none of which will be successful on its own. 31 
